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Introduction 
The Vienna Circle is generally regarded as an apolitical group. Its 
members are depicted as preoccupied with the logical analysis of scientific 
knowledge, dismissing value-laden questions of politics as outside their 
area of competence. But one notable figure - Otto Neurath (1882-1945) -
certainly belies this view. The difference between Neurath and other 
members of the Vienna Circle is sharply etched by Rudolf Carnap: 
All of us in the Circle were strongly interested in social 
and political progress. Most of us, myself included, were 
socialists. But we liked to keep our philosophical work 
separated from our political aims. In our view, logic, 
including applied logic, and the theory of knowledge, the 
analysis of language, and the methodology of science, 
are, like science itself, neutral with respect to practical 
aims ... for a society. Neurath criticized strongly this 
neutralist attitude, which in his opinion gave aid and 
comfort to the enemies of social progress.* 
One of the few members of the Vienna Circle with extensive training 
and professional interest in social disciplines, Neurath formed a 
commitment to Marxism in the First World War, a comparatively 
undogmatic commitment expressing his view that theories are 
programmes to be developed through constant reappraisal. 
Attention in this paper will be focused on relations between Neurath's 
Marxism and his metascience, as expressed in his writings during the 
career of the Vienna Circle (circa 1925-1933). 
* The authors are grateful to anonymous readers of the journal for several 
helpful suggestions. 
* Rudolf Carnap, "Camap's Intellectual Autobiography," the Philosophy of 
Rudolf Carnap, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 
1963), p. 23. Emphasis added. 
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Neurath's Historical Framework 
Neurath's ideas on science and politics are set in a broad historical 
perspective, elements of which owe to Marx and Engcls' materialist 
conception of history (as will become apparent below), and which is 
possibly influenced by the account of cultural evolution in J . G. Frazer's 
The Golden Rough? 
In The Golden Bough the course of human culture is described as a 
sequence of magical, religious and scientific 'ages.' Frazer (in the second 
and following editions of the work) contrasts magic against religion, and 
describes magic as 'identical' to science in respect of being based on belief 
in 'the order and uniformity of nature.'^ 
Neurath, for his part, looks on magic, religion and science not as 
distinguishable ages but as types of thought. Rather than being separated 
by breaks or ruptures, these modes long coexist and form complex 
relations with one another. Magic and science are bracketed by Neurath 
as empirical in character and predictive in purpose, and he cites a number 
of specific substantive similarities. For instance, in 'the primitive 
conception, a corpse is often taboo; whoever touches it brings death upon 
himself. (Modern analogy: infection.) Or: disease is removed by 
incisions, tattooings, into the body. (Analogy: bleeding, operations.)'^ The 
principal difference lies in science attaining a higher degree of systematic 
control by experience. 
Where magicians claimed powers over nature, Christianity effectively 
abnegated these powers by attributing every event to God's will, which 
'closed outlook' Neurath dismisses as unverifiable and meaningless. 
Religious thinking extends into philosophy. Theologians have allies in 
metaphysicians and moral philosophers, particularly idealist philosophers 
in the tradition of Kant. Opposed to theologians and their philosophical 
allies arc 'adherents of a scientific view of the world, recognizing no 
authority other than science. For them the task is to make predictions 
2The evidence for possible influence consists in their typology of thought 
as religious, magical and scientific, and in Neurath's sharing Frazer's view 
that magic displays substantive similarities, both broad and specific, with 
science. For approving references to Frazer sec: Otto Neurath, 
Philosophical Papers 1913-1946, eds. and trans. Robert S. Cohen and Marie 
Neurath (Dordrecht: Reidd, 1983) p. 33; and Otto Neurath, Empiricism 
and Sociology, eds. Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, trans. Paul 
Foulkcs and Marie Neurath (Dordrecht: Reidcl, 1973) p. 321. 
J J . G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 3rd ed., part 1, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 
1911) p. 220, also xx. 
^Neurath, Papers, p. 34. 
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about testable states of affairs.'^ In Neurath's essentially pragmatic 
conception of science, prediction is stressed rather than classification and 
explanation. Since the Renaissance, the scientific mode of thought has, he 
believes, gradually developed alongside religion and metaphysics. Physics 
has come to be purged of metaphysical doctrines (e.g. absolute space and 
absolute motion), and the time Neurath now sees as ripe for social science 
to undergo similar cleansing. 
In Anti-Duhring, Engels described contradiction as the 'main lever of 
all intellectual advance,'** and Neurath as well is keenly aware of 
contradictions in cultural developments. Religious thinkers have 
contributed to science and unwittingly undermined Christian thought. 
Logic and mathematics have been advanced by theologians, 
mathematical astronomy benefited from Kepler's search for divine 
harmony in the universe, the conservative Catholic, Duhem, has advanced 
understanding of science. German idealists, for their part, unwittingly 
contributed to the rise of Marx and Engels' doctrine of historical 
materialism, which lies at the centre of Neurath's perspective. Although 
mindful that relations between its categories of economic base and 
superstructure (state, culture and social consciousness) remain to be 
accurately defined and explained, Neurath's assessment of historical 
materialism is not seriously impaired by this for he commends it as a 
genuinely scientific view. 
Neurath affirms the Marxist order of feudal, capitalist, and socialist 
phases of economic-political development, and indicates that they overlap 
with the three modes of thought above. Theological thinking, for instance, 
dominated the feudal order and has remained ascendant in the capitalist 
period to date. But science and technology are gaining in popularity and 
come into increasing conflict with theological thinking, reflecting the 
mechanization of the process of production and the polarization of social 
classes. To defend its power and privileges the bourgeoisie has entered a 
conservative alliance with clerical groups, while the proletariat is attracted 
to unified science which under socialism, Neurath predicts, will become 
the ascendant mode of thought. In the 1920s and 30s, he believed, 
Christian theology and idealist metaphysics were being reasserted in a last 
desperate attempt to stem the rising tide of science and Marxist socialism. 
Marxism and Physicalism 
Neurath's account of science is set within the foregoing perspective on 
history. In clarifying science, he sees himself contributing to the future 
^Neurath, Empiricism, p. 325. 
^Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing, 1959), p. 57, also 39. 
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socialist culture. At the heart of his metasdence is 'physicalism,' an 
attempt at reformulating materialist ontology as a semantic thesis. Can we 
say that Neurath's political commitment to Marxism is influential here, 
that his mctascicnce and, in particular, physicalism, are an outgrowth of 
the materialist conception of history? Neurath himself may have believed 
this, for he says that over 'the last hundred years, materialism was usually 
connected with progressive ideas in political and social matters, while 
idealism was associated with reactionary attitudes.'^ But in fact, Marx's 
application of the term 'materialism' to human affairs and history carries 
not the strict philosophical connotation of 'real' being equated with 
'material' but is an ascription of explanatory primacy to production and 
property relations. We do well to heed, and will quote in full, these 
cautionary words of John Plamcnatz: 
I doubt whether it is possible to elicit from his [Marx's] 
writings any coherent version of materialism. This docs 
not mean that we can ascribe no definite opinions to 
him. We can say, for example, that he was not the kind 
of materialist who holds that mental activities can be 
reduced to bodily movements and to motions in the 
brain, or can be treated as mere effects of them. There is 
virtually nothing in his writings to suggest that he held 
this view, and a great deal to suggest that he did not.® 
Nor to the best of our knowledge, are there unequivocal affirmations of 
philosophical, as distinct from historical, materialism in the works of 
Engcls. 
Neurath's physicalism makes the meaning of a statement a function 
of its having referents located in space and time. Only one language is 
meaningful in Neurath's view, the objective or inter-subjective physicalist 
language. Another key element in Neurath's theory of science is one 
which in this paper will be designated 'linguistic closure." This doctrine has 
three elements: knowledge can only be expressed in statements; 
statements arc only comparable with one another; statements can never 
be appraised in terms of (compared with) 'reality,' things or experiences.^ 
Linguistic closure markedly contrasts a position such as Wittgenstein's in 
^Neurath, Empiricism, p. 44. 
fyohn Plamcnatz, Karl Marx's Theory of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), p. 17. 
^Elisabeth Ncmcth, Otto Neurath und der Wiener Kreis (Frankfurt: 
Campus Vcrlag, 1981), p. 133. This facet of Neurath's thought interestingly 
presages a central them of Nelson Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking 
(Hassocks: Harvester, 1978), p. 4. 
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the Tractalus, where he states that 'Reality is compared with propositions' 
(4.05) and 'A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a 
picture of reality' (4.06). 1 0 
Neurath's doctrines of physicalism and linguistic closure represent a 
via media between two epistemologies prominent at the time: the 
subjectivism of Ernst Mach, and Lenin's naive realism. In the late 20s, 
when Neurath was fashioning his own distinctive positivism, Lenin's 
defence of realism in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909) was 
official doctrine in the USSR and canonical for many Marxists in the West. 
Neurath was aware of this work, occasionally referring to it, but never 
delving into it in depth. The bulk of the work expounds and attacks the 
empirio-critics, Mach and Richard Avenarius; and the likes of Bogdanov, 
Bazarov, and Lunarcharsky, whose Machian interpretations of Marxism 
were spurned by Lenin as heretical. 
The gist of empirio-criticism is well conveyed in these words of Mach: 
'Nature is composed of sensations as its elements.... Properly speaking the 
world is not composed of "things" as its elements, but of colors, tones, 
pressures, spaces, times, in short what we ordinarily call individual 
sensations.'1 1 
In opposition to the pheonomenalism that he ascribed to Mach, Lenin 
affirmed matter as the only reality. He coupled this with the naive realist 
conviction that objective reality is presented to us directly in experience 
and provides our standard for assessing knowledge-claims.1^ For Lenin 
and the Bolsheviks, empirio-criticism amounted to a denial that 'science 
could know anything about the objective world' and with this, it was said, 
l u Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears 
and B. F. McCuinness, 2nd ed. (London: Routlcdge, 1974). 
1 1 Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, trans. Thomas McCormack, 6th 
ed. (Lasalle: Open Court, 1960), p. 579; cf. Ernst Mach, The Analysis of 
Sensations, trans. C. M. Williams and Sydney Waterlow, 5th ed. (New 
York: Dover, 1959), p. 29ff. 
for example: V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: 
Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy (Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing, 1947), pp. 33,44,48,69,83,102,126-127. 
In contrast to Lenin's outright hostility, Neurath's attitude to 
Avenarius and Mach was one of discriminating ambivalence. While 
abjuring their phenomenalism, Neurath was unquestionably influenced 
by Mach's advocacy of the unity of science and of a unitary scientific 
language and, more perhaps than any other member of the Vienna Circle, 
he drew inspiration form Mach's anti-metaphysical stance. 
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the door is opened 'to other ways of finding the truth, particularly to the 
ways of traditional religion.'^ 
Although he seems at no stage in his philosophical career to have 
accepted naive realism as tenable, and while such realism is plainly 
incompatible with his thesis of linguistic closure, Neurath felt no 
temptation to doubt the existence of the material world. His preferred 
position of physicalism reformulates materialism, with denizens of the 
space-time order and relations that exist between them being treated as 
the only subjects of meaningful language. Materialism in traditional 
formulations is vitiated, in Neurath's view, by its presenting mind as a 
function of matter, thus extending at least de facto recognition to the 
mental realm. Neurath rejected mind and mental states as irredeemably 
metaphysical, and he counselled against analyzing the meaning of 
'matter' for reason of incipient 'subjectivitist tendencies.'* ^ One 
subjectivist tendency that became prominent in the writings of members 
of the Vienna Circle, which Neurath was particularly keen to see stamped 
out, was phenomenalism. An example is Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau 
der Welt (1928) with its logistic programme for constituting inter-
subjective concepts of science out of elementary phenomenalist 
experiences, using the symbolic logic of Whitehead and Russell's 
Principia Mathemalica. Neurath, whose view Carnap was later to adopt, 
argued to the contrary that use of a phenomenalist basis leads to idealist 
metaphysics. The inter-subjective statements of science, Neurath 
claimed, cannot have their meanings constituted from phenomenalist 
concepts whose supposed referents are private experiences, inaccessible 
in space and time.*^ 
Physicalism and the doctrine of linguistic closure are fashioned by 
Neurath as intellectual weapons for class struggle. They enable socialists 
to expose the bourgeoisie's metaphysical and religious dogmas as 
anachronistic and meaningless cant. Physicalism is also crucial to the 
construction of unified science - the nub of the new socialist culture - with 
which we shall deal below. 
*3phi1ipp Frank, Modern Science and Its Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1949), p. 17. See also Loren Graham, Science and Philosophy 
in the Soviet Union (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 42ff.; and John T. 
Blackmorc, Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence (Berkeley: 
California UP, 1972), p. 236ff. 
*^ Neurath, Empiricism , p. 359. 
1 5Ncmeth, p. 104. 
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Neurath's Metascience 
Most studies of logical positivism depict it as revolving around the 
verification principle which, in the original published formulation given it 
by Frederick Waismann, locates the meaning of a cognitive or factually 
informative statement in its method of verification. Before any such 
statement can be tested, its meaning, the principle implies, must be 
ascertained by specifying under what circumstances it could be proven 
true. For the student of Neurath it is a fact of signal interest that he 
seldom mentions and never seriously avails himself of the verification 
principle. Instead of treating meaning as a function of verification or of 
any other method, he connects it to the (for him) only genuine subject 
matter, the space-time domain of physicalism. The physicalist language of 
science and common sense contains at any time the entire available 
corpus of meaningful statements. 
It follows from the doctrine of physicalism that philosophy is a bogus 
discipline. Philosophical locutions are meaningless, being neither 
tautological transformations such as occur in mathematics and logic, nor 
physicalist statements. Nor, according to Neurath, is there any 
philosophical activity of conceptual elucidation in the way that 
Wittgenstein and Schlick imagined. Karl Menger records that 'In the 
early 1930s, after Carnap had gone to Prague, a controversy ... arose in the 
Circle when Waismann (echoing the latest thoughts of WittgcnsteinJ 
proclaimed that one could not speak about language.'1** Neurath, with his 
brother-in-law Hans Hahn, took strong exception to this view. Neurath 
was adamant that the scientific language of physicalism can be used in 
reference to itself.1 ^  Language itself is spatio-tcmporally situated as 
sounds and inscriptions on pages, so the study of language is within the 
compass of science. 
Waismann, Schlick and others looked on phcnomenalist (private 
experience) statements as verifiers or test-statements for scientific laws 
and theories. Neurath, in contrast, advocated protocol statements, which 
are shorn of subjective elements and use only physicalist terms. 
Protocol statements are factual statements of the 
same linguistic form as other factual statements, but in 
them a personal name always occurs several times, in a 
definite connection with other terms. A complete 
16Karl Menger, Logic and Mathematics, ed. Brian McCuinness 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), p. xii. 
^Hciner Ruttc, "Der Philosoph Otto Neurath," Arbeiterbildung in der 
Zwischenkriegszeit Otto Neurath, ed. Cerd Arntz (Wien/Munchen: 
Locker Verlag, 1982), p. 76. 
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protocol statement might for example be worded like 
this: "Otto's protocol at 3:17 o'clock [Otto's speech-
thinking at 3:16 o'clock was (at 3:15 o'clock there was a 
table in the room perceived by Otto))."*® 
The parenthetic expression records Otto's initial experience, and that 
which is bracketed reports his subsequent private verbal response. Proper 
names are preferred to personal pronouns 'in order that the components 
of the protocol may be independently tested, e.g. by being found in the 
protocols of other observers. The protocols of different observers may 
conflict, and when this happens at least one of them is to be rejected.'* 9 
At this stage there is an equivocation to expose at the heart of 
Neurath's mctascicnce. A number of his remarks about protocols suggest 
a traditional empiricist model of appraisal in which concrete statements of 
observations or experimental results (protocol statements) confront 
individual laws or hypotheses.2^ In this view, which predominated among 
members of the Vienna Circle and was embedded in their vcrifiability 
principle, test statements or protocols are privileged in deciding the fate of 
generalizations. But Neurath's apparent endorsement of this model jars 
with his thesis of linguistic closure which, we recall, denies the possibility of 
comparing statements with 'reality' or experience. From this conjunction 
of doctrines, questions arise as to how protocol or test statements, as 
fallible records of experience, are themselves to be controlled or assessed 
by experience, and why they should be privileged in evaluating 
generalizations. Neurath never seriously confronts these difficulties. 
The second model of appraisal in Neurath's writings is holistic rather 
than atomic as above, and owes much to the French polymath Pierre 
Duhcm whose influence not merely on Neurath but on the Vienna Circle 
as a whole would almost certainly repay closer examination than it has 
received to date. Philipp Frank has related how ideas of Duhem along 
with those of his compatriot Pioncare were assimilated as early as 1907 by 
himself, Neurath and Hans Hahn in discussions they had together of Abel 
Rcy's La Theorie de physique chez les physiciens contemporains (1907). 2* 
Neurath was particularly impressed by Duhem's arguments for the 
inconclusivencss of scientific experiments. Affirming the holistic 
1 8Ncurath, Papers, p. 93. 
1 9 R . W. Ashby, "Logical Positivism," A Critical History of Western 
Philosophy, ed. D. J. O'Connor (London: Free Press, 1964), p. 501. 
2^Otto Neurath, "Prognosen und Terminologie in Physik, Biologie, 
Soziologic," Travaux Du lXe Congres Internationale De Philosophic (Paris, 
1937), pp. 82-84. 
21 Frank, p. 3. 
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character of scientific knowledge, Duhem himself described as follows 
what he took to be the practical upshot of that holism: 
the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to 
experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; 
when the experiment is in disagreement with his 
predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the 
hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and 
ought to be modified; but the experiment does not 
designate which one should be changed.^ 
A point that Neurath bases on this and which is severally repeated by him 
is that contradictions between experimental results and systems of 
hypotheses can always be removed through the addition of auxiliary 
hypotheses. Duhem agreed with Poincare that consistency between 
theories and experimental results is no indication of truth since an infinite 
number of theories may be imposed on any given set of observation 
reports. Experimental results, as Neurath puts it, are 'ambiguous', which is 
tantamount to what philosophers nowadays term the 'underdetcrmination' 
of theories by data. 
Neurath's second model of scientific appraisal combines the ideas of 
Duhem with his own doctrine of linguistic closure. Protocol sentences in 
this model have no privileged role as test statements, and if they 
contradict hypotheses scientists are free to reject either. Statements are 
not appraised by objective empirical testing, being incomparable with 
experience or reality. Scientists are without this resource in deciding which 
statements are to be included in the corpus of current scientific 
knowledge. Whether intentionally or unwittingly, Neurath's account 
deprives science of empirical character by effectively denying constraints 
of experience. His only requirement is for scientists to eliminate 
contradictions between statements. Neurath to the contrary, there is more 
than a faint suggestion in this model of what might be termed a coherence 
theory of 'acceptance' of scientific statements. Perhaps his lack of 
frankness about 'coherence* owed to the coherence theory of truth having 
been a central part of the (for Neurath) philosophical anathema of 
absolute idealism. Be that as it may, of the existence of objective 
standards of truth and falsity Neurath became increasingly doubtful, 
recommending in later works that they be ignored altogether. The second 
of Neurath's models of appraisal come to coalesce with skepticism. 
^Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. Philip 
P. Wiener (New York: Atheneum, 1981), p. 187. 
184 AUSLEGUNG 
One of the more enduringly interesting of Neurath's metascientific 
papers is a review of Karl Popper's Logik der Forschung (1934).^3 It 
presages by almost thirty years, motifs of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962) which have the status nowadays of received 
dogmas. Among these anticipations are Neurath's advocacy of an 
historically informed, non-prescriptive metascience; his thesis that 
scientists are usually elaborating rather than testing theoretical structures, 
and his denials of a final goal for scientific research and of rules to guide 
scientists' choices of protocols and generalizations. 
Abjuring the prescriptive mood of Popper's Logik der Forschung, 
which is manifested in its distinctive methodological rules, Neurath 
presents his metascience to account for the historical development of 
science. The unit of scientific research is not the discrete theory, as 
envisaged by Popper, but an 'encyclopedia' or loose structure of 
theoretical and protocol statements, which foreshadows Kuhn's notion of 
'paradigm' as the 'disciplinary matrix' or presuppositional framework 
within which a community practices 'normal science.' Encyclopedias, as 
depicted by Neurath, are not subjects for experimental tests but 
programmes with histories to which statements are added and removed to 
achieve consistency between theories and protocols. 
Taking heed of Duhcm's arguments against conclusive experimental 
appraisals of scientific theories or laws, and recognizing the complexity of 
actual research situations, Neurath rejects the suggestion of a monistic 
scientific method, which anticipates the method-pluralism discussed in 
Paul Feycrabcnd's polemic Against Method. The vcrificationism of his 
colleagues in the Vienna Circle and Popper's method of falsification are 
both dismissed by Neurath. An encyclopedia rarely agrees with all 
relevant protocols. Certain protocols will be consistent with predictions 
and others inconsistent, which relations Neurath respectively designates 
as 'confirmations' and 'shakings' (contradictions shake the confidence of 
scientists in encyclopedias). The decisions of scientists regarding research 
projects can never be determined by protocols. Some scientists may 
disregard 'shaking' protocols and continue developing an encyclopedia; 
others may seek to eliminate contradictions with the aid of auxiliary 
hypotheses; yet others may reject a seemingly well supported 
encyclopedia in the belief that it obstructs further development in their 
branch of science. Science is substantially an extra-logical process in 
which decisions to accept or reject encyclopedias or their component 
statements have to be taken without recourse to general rules or criteria. 
Such theorists as Popper who fail to appreciate that scientists' decisions 
arc inherently subjective and ad hoc are accused by Neurath of 
paper is "Pscudorationalismus der Falsifikation" (1935), translated 
in Philosophical Papers as "Pscudorationalism of Falsification." 
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'pseudorationalism.' As there exists no 'special theory of the importance . . 
. for the progress of science or life in general' of the various social and 
technical factors that influence their discriminations between specific 
statements and between encyclopedias, scientists are perforce their own 
touchstones.2* 
In scientific change, Neurath sees both continuities and 
discontinuities. Acceptance or rejection of statements always occurs 
within an inherited corpus of knowledge, this being the point of his famous 
metaphor of cognitive boat repair. Scientists 'are like sailors who on the 
open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh 
from the bottom.'2^ Within this corpus, however, there are discontinuities 
in the ontologies of successive theories or encyclopedias even, Neurath 
suggests, when a new theory entails all its predecessor's predictions. What 
Neurath implacably opposes is the idea of finality in science, of successive 
scientific encyclopedias progressing towards an ultimate encyclopedia 
which is comprehensively informative and accurate. Such in essence was 
Popper's vision of the aim of science in Logic der Forschung. 
Sociology as Part of Unified Science. 
In the broadest of Neurath's several senses, 'unified science' signifies 
a programme for promoting physicalist language. The programme is 
directed at expunging theological and metaphysical expressions from 
natural languages (expressions which Neurath presented in an 'index 
verborum prohibitorum'), and at coordinating these languages with the 
language of science. Referring exclusively to space-time relations, 
purified languages would translate readily into one another. Neurath 
envisaged them as a 'universal jargon'2** of physicalism, simplifying 
communication between cultures and advancing the cause of socialist 
internationalism.2? 
^Neurath, Papers , p. 157; cf. p. 134. The ideal of social factors influencing 
scientists' deliberations and choices, which is suggested by Neurath on a 
number of occasions, bespeaks an embryonic sociology of science. This 
may have owed something to Mannheim whose Ideologic und Utopie 
Neurath reviewed in 1930. 
^Neurath, Empiricism, p. 199. 
2**26. Otto Neurath, "Foundations of the Social Sciences" in Foundations 
of the Unity of Science, vol. 2, eds. Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Charles 
Morris (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1970), p. 6. 
2?Nemeth 109. Another instrument for international communication to 
which Neurath devoted a good deal of attention was an "isotypc' picture 
language, inspired by Egyptian hieroglyphics. See his monograph Modern 
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In a more restrictive sense, 'unified science' marks a project for 
reforming the 'encyclopedia' comprising all currently accepted scientific 
statements.2® The goal ascribed by Neurath to this project is piecemeal 
filling of gaps, and elimination of ambiguities and contradictions between 
statements so that laws of different disciplines can be brought together to 
improve the accuracy and range of scientific predictions. Accurate 
concrete predictions cannot be achieved within any one scientific 
discipline. To predict, for example, the course of a fire would require 
chemical, meteorological, sociological, physical laws etc., which 'must be 
conceived as parts of a system . . . of unified science.'^ 'System' is apt to 
mislead in this context, suggesting that Neurath urges the integration of 
science into one deductive hierarchy of statements. This, for him, would 
be impossible; the corpus of scientific statements is permanently in flux, 
the upshot being that unified science is restricted to particular deductive 
ordcrings. 
In his discussions of unified science, in the sense just distinguished, 
Neurath's attention is mainly focused on social science, though he sees no 
material difference between the subject-matters or methods of social and 
physical sciences. The suggestion of Dilthey and his followers that Das 
Verstehen is distinctive of human studies receives from Neurath the tart 
reply that it (empathy) 'may help the research worker* but enters 'the 
totality of scientific statements as little as does a good cup of coffee which 
also furthers a scholar in his work.'^0 Social scientists are required by 
Neurath to use only physicalist statements and in psychology, specifically, 
mcntalistic terms (designating thoughts, feelings, wants, motives etc.) that 
cannot be translated into words referring to bodily processes must be 
excluded from unified science. 
Having earlier shown that Marxism permeates Neurath's perspective 
on history and that he views his theory of knowledge as a contribution to 
socialist culture, it remains to complete the circle of his thought by 
examining how he justifies Marxism as a component of unified science. 
Neurath's most important work on sociology is the monograph, 
Empirische Soziologie, that appeared in 1931. The study rests on a 
physicalist social ontology: 'One can make no mistake',' Neurath assures, 
'if one speaks everywhere of precisely specifiable spatio-temporal objects 
Man in the Making (New York: Knopf, 1939). 
2 *The term encyclopedia is also used by Neurath as a proper noun in the 
collective title of a projected twenty six volume International Encyclopedia 
of Unified Science (to be accompanied by a ten volume Visual Thesaurus), 
only two volumes of which have so far seen the light of day. 
^Neurath, Papers, p. 59. 
3 0Neurath, Empiricism, p. 357. 
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(. . . of the state as an aggregate of men, streets, houses, prisons . . . ) . ' 3 1 
Methodological individualism would seem a natural concomitant for this 
ontology, yet statements comprising collective concepts (peoples, tribes, 
classes and the like) are freely used by Neurath, with no suggestion of 
their having to be reduced to statements about concrete or typical 
individuals. Prediction, the paramount aim of physicalist sociology, relics 
on laws of statistical frequencies, most of which are relative to particular 
social periods. The proper subjects of social scientific predictions are 
social groups (structures of individuals), which are seen as having greater 
stability or regularity than single individuals. Physicalist sociology is 
broadly behaviourist, with social groups being individuated by distinctive 
customs and by close stimulus-response between their members. 
The course of human life is treated no differently by a 
strictly scientific sociology than . . . life in an ants' nest or 
in a bee-hive. We investigate the influence of such 
course of events on the living standard, on the conditions 
of pleasure and displeasure of the participants, where 
pleasure and displeasure are consistently defined by 
observable behaviour.3^ 
The discipline of sociology Neurath sees as having emerged last 
century from history and political economy. Marx and Engels effectively 
synthesized these disciplines by tracing social change to economic factors 
and effectively showing that socialism can be predicted from social-
economic developments. The materialist conception of history is 
physicalist and therefore part of unified science. 'Of all the attempts at 
creating a strictly scientific unmetaphysical physicalist sociology, Marxism 
is the most complete.' 3 3 
Marxism qua scientific theory of society simultaneously provides a 
spur to and strategy for social change. The use of Marxism by the Soviet 
state for social engineering in the 1920s and 30s exemplifies, for Neurath, 
its role as technology for constructing socialism. In capitalist societies of 
the West, in turn, he regards Marxism as a source of solidarity and 
inspiration for the revolutionary proletariat. This class is animated by 
Marxism's forecast of the capitalist market economy being replaced by a 
wholly planned administrative economy in which the technology and 
large-scale institutions of capitalism will be used to create a classless, 
equitable society. More ambitiously still, Neurath looks forward to a 
31 Neurath, Empiricism, p. 352. 
^Neurath, Papers, p. 45. 
3 3 Neurath , Empiricism , p. 349; also Otto Neurath, "Burgerlicher 
Marxismus," Der Kampf 23 (1930): 227-232. 
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classless world socialist state, managed according to a single international 
economic plan. 
One cannot help but be struck by Neurath's using Marxism as if it 
were an empirically privileged system whose predictions of the decline of 
capitalism and of the emergence and character of socialism were beyond 
doubt. Yet nothing in his abstract analysis of the status of social scientific 
prediction justifies such surety. 'Sometimes a change in a sociological 
situation may be predictable though the direction of the change cannot be 
known. . . . But this happens in physics too: a cone spinning on its point 
will fall, but which way, cannot be predicted.*3* Long-range accuracy is 
disturbed by intrinsic novelty or periodization in social development. 
Factual laws or uniformities of social life are relative to specific social 
structures, and as concepts concerning different types of economic and 
social conditions presuppose at least some acquaintance with those 
conditions, concepts are often available for formulating predictions. 
Another of Neurath's arguments suggests that the idea of predicting 
knowledge is paradoxical*^ for, were it predictable, knowledge would be 
available in the premises of the predictive inference. These arguments 
sabotage rather than support Neurath's dogmatic confidence in Marx's 
social forecasts. 
Close examination of Neurath's account of social science reveals an 
equivocation regarding relations between social change and sociological 
predictions of it. The nub of the matter is this: when sociologists succeed 
in predicting an event or development, has the development occurred 
despite or because of their predictions? Are sociological predictions 
causes (or part-causes) of social processes, exerting a self-fulfilling effect 
and, if so, are they deliberately conceived with this in mind? Both views of 
prediction are suggested in Neurath's writings. The didactic one, that 
social prediction concerns events that occur independently of it, is 
intimated when Neurath says that Marxism 
can describe the whole structure of an age as a historical 
formation with special laws conditioned by the situation 
of the time (each social order has e.g. its own laws of 
population). The derivation of a distribution of living 
standards from existing conditions leads to a deduction 
of a social order from the old. ^ 
3 4 Neurath, Empiricism, p. 362. 
3 5 Thcre is surely irony in the fact that Popper, a thinker as hostile to 
Marxism as Neurath is approving, presents materially the same argument 
in the preface of his The Poverty of Historicism. There is nothing to say, 
however, that Popper obtained his argument from Neurath. 
3 6Ncurath, Empiricism, p. 358-359. 
OTTO NEURATH 
Elsewhere, however, Neurath argues that predictions ineluctably 
influence social development, and should be consciously so used. He 
suggests that social change obeys no independent laws and that 
predictions of Marxism arc instruments for galvanizing the proletariat. 
Common 'planned action' he remarks 'is possible only if the participants 
make common predictions.' He states that 'Pseudo-rationalism is inclined 
to treat everything as calculable, whereas strict science comes to admit the 
multiple interpretations of its systems, and to leave the unitary character 
of life to other factors, above all to common agreement on decisions.'3^ Be 
this as it may, one cannot help noticing Neurath's convenient omission of 
complicating factors, there being no discussion for example of self-
defeating predictions such as Marxism's predictions forewarning class 
enemies and strengthening opposition to the proletariat. 
This problem of assigning conflicting roles to prediction is obviously 
not inherent in Marxism, as can be seen from the works of Louis Althusscr, 
For Marx and Reading Capital. According to him, Marx's philosophy (in 
particular, what commentators distinguish as dialectical materialism) 
envisages knowledge as practice taking place within thought; Marx 
presents the theory of theoretical practice. Practice in each science, while 
devoted to seeking knowledge of real objects, remains unavoidably 
confined to working on and transforming theoretical objects. The validity 
of products of theoretical practice is decided in terms of, not external 
reality but, standards internal to science, and the development of each 
science, in parallel fashion, is internally driven, without regard to social 
exigencies. One can imagine that this position would have been broadly 
congenial to Neurath, certain of whose own views (theories as 
programmatic structures; reality screened off by theory; 
underdetermination of theory by 'facts') can be seen as partial 
presagements. But, and this is crucial, in Althusser's interpretation of 
Marx, Neurath's problem of whether to interpret social scientific 
predictions literally or pragmatically simply does not arise. Theoretical 
practice proceeds independently of, and untested in terms of, external 
reality. 
^Neurath, Empiricism , p. 407. 
